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Impelled Perpetration Restated
By ROLLIN M. PERKINS*

A choice between two evils, however desperate the situation, must
not be confused with no choice at all. The distinction may be illustrated by comparing two hypothetical situations. Suppose that D, A,
and X are standing near the edge of a high cliff. In one instance, D
suddenly grabs A and shoves her so violently against X that X is forced
over the edge and falls to his death. In the second situation, P does not
touch A but instead points a pistol at A and threatens to kill her if she
does not push X off the cliff. Firmly believing that she will be killed
instantly if she does not obey, A reluctantly shoves X, causing X to fall
to his death. In either case, D has caused the death of X; A, however,
has caused X's death only in the latter case. In the first situation, A's
body was simply used as a tool to cause the death of X; A did not
perpetrate the killing. In the second example, despite her reluctance A
intentionally killed X; A was subjected to impelled perpetration. The
difference is between compulsion applied to the body and compulsion
applied to the mind.
The doctrines of impelled perpetration-duress and necessity, with
the exception of the "inexcusable choice," and the choice of evilshave long been recognized to excuse certain otherwise legally punishable conduct. Unfortunately, however, these tenets have too often been
viewed narrowly and applied rigidly. 1 In this Article, therefore, they
are reexamined.

The "Inexcusable Choice"
The common law has always held firm to the proposition that one
may not choose between oneself and another, who may live and who
must die, by intentionally killing an obviously innocent and unoffend* Connell Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles, 1957;
Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1975.
A.B., University of Kansas, 1910; J.D., Stanford University, 1912; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1916.
1. See text accompanying notes 37-48 infra.
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ing 2 person to preserve one's own life. Such a killing is criminal homicide. 3 It has been argued that an excuse should be recognized when a
person, under threat of instant death, commits a terrible deed: if his or
her own conscience will not prevent the deed, no threat of what the law
may do at some distant time could have any deterring influence. 4 The
argument, although persuasive, misses the point. The criminal law is a
moral code and the recognition of an excuse under these circumstances
would declare such an intentional killing to be morally acceptable.
The consistent refusal of common-law judges to excuse such an act
serves to emphasize the strength of the moral prohibition against a killing of this kind.- As Blackstone contended, a person "ought rather to
6
die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent."
The common-law principle that "no man can excuse himself,
under the plea of necessity or compulsion, for taking the life of an innocent person,'"'7 has been repeated, in substance, time and again. 8 For
example, the famous American case, United States v. Holmes,9 arose
2. Use of deadly force is justified if it was necessary to save the actor's life from a
raving maniac, even if the maniac is "innocent" of crime because of his or her mental disorder. At times the word "unoffending" has been added to provide for this situation, although

some other word, such as "harmless," might be more appropriate. The use of "innocent and
unoffending" for this purpose dates back at least to the time of Lord Coleridge. See The
Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286, 15 Cox C.C. 624, 636 (1884). More frequently today the idea is left to be understood without the use of any such word.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 529 F.2d 1148, 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 950 (1976) (coercion is not a defense to murder); State v. Taylor, 22 Wash. App.
308, 317, 589 P.2d 1250, 1255 (1979) (approving instruction stating that duress is not a defense to the crime of murder); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *30 [hereinafter cited as
BLACKSTONE]; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *51 [ hereinafter cited as HALE]; Cf. State

v. Greene, 5 Kan. App. 298, 304, 623 P.2d 933, 936 (1981) (criminal trespass case; court notes
that the compulsion defense, when available, justifies any crime short of homicide).
4.

G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 246 (2d ed. 1961).

5. See Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 1957) ("[alt least one purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social condemnation of forbidden conduct.");
Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12, 12 So. 301, 303-04 (1893). "Knowledge of the wrong of killing an
innocent person even to preserve one's own life can be inculcated by the dramatic instruction of the criminal courts." J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 418 (1947).

6. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *30. Hale pointed out that, even facing death, a
person has no excuse for killing an innocent victim; the killing of the threatener, however,
may be excused. 1 HALE, supra note 3, at *51. See also Leach v. State, 99 Tenn. 584, 595, 42
S.W. 195, 197 (1897).
7. Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12, 12 So. 301, 303 (1893).
8. See, e.g., R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605
(1st Cir. 1949); People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 102, 108 P. 1034, 1036 (1910); State v.
Clay, 220 Iowa 1191, 1203, 264 N.W. 77, 83 (1935); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.
1953); State v. Weston, 109 Or. 19, 37, 219 P. 180, 185 (1923); State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I.
299, 304, 58 A. 953, 955 (1904).
9. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
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after a ship struck an iceberg and sank in midocean. Before the vessel
went down, boats were lowered, carrying the passengers and members
of the crew. These boats quickly scattered. One was so overloaded that
its occupants were barely able to move in their crowded positions. The
next day a squall developed, threatening to send the overcrowded craft,
which was not a modem lifeboat, to the bottom. That night, the officer
in charge ordered the crew to jettison some of the occupants. Holmes
and the other sailors seized sixteen passengers and threw them overboard. Thus lightened, the boat managed to ride the waves until a rescue ship arrived the following day. The officer and most of the crew
disappeared after landing, but Holmes went on to Philadelphia, where
he was arrested for the federal crime of murder on the high seas. Although all conceded that the boat would not have survived the storm
had the load not been lightened, the court would not recognize any
excuse for Holmes's actions.
The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens,'0 an equally famous English
case, arose out of similar circumstances. At the trial of two men indicted for willful murder, the jury returned a special verdict stating the
following findings of fact. The defendants and another sailor, ablebodied English seamen, and the deceased, a boy of about seventeen,
the crew of an English yacht, were cast away in a storm on the high
seas 1,600 miles from land and were compelled to escape in an open
boat. They consumed all their provisions in twelve days and, after
eight days without food and six days without water, the defendants perceived that there was no appreciable chance of survival except by killing someone for the others to eat. The defendants decided to kill the
boy. Lying weak and helpless on the bottom of the boat, the boy was
unable to resist. The sailors fed upon the body and blood of the boy
for four days, and then were picked up by a passing vessel. The jury
further found that at the time of the killing there appeared to the defendants every possibility that, unless they fed upon the boy, or one of
themselves, they would die of starvation. However, the boy did not
assent to his own killing and the jury found no more compelling reason
to kill the boy than to kill any of the others. The court held that this
special verdict revealed no justification or excuse for the killing and
was, in effect, a verdict of guilty of willful murder.
In Holmes, the evidence indicated that the captain, who was in
another boat when some of the victims were thrown overboard, had
given instructions that lots should be cast if such an emergency arose,
10.

14 Q.B.D. 273, 15 Cox C.C. 624 (1884).
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and the trial court indicated that this was "the fairest mode, and, in
some sort, as an appeal to God, for the selection of the victim.""I Such
a suggestion was disapproved in dictum in Dudley,'2 but it seems to
have much to commend it. If an actual case arises in which the fatal
selection is shown to have been made fairly by lot, the procedure probably will be approved.
While the common law consistently condemns, in a choice between oneself and an obviously innocent person, the intentional killing
of the latter, certain superficially similar choices may be excusable and
thus escape the common law's absolute prohibition. Consider, hypothetically, a man and a child, total strangers, driven through the countryside in a small horse-drawn vehicle. Suddenly, at a remote spot,
they are attacked by ferocious beasts. The driver attempts to elude
them, but the horse cannot outdistance the beasts. At the last moment,
the man throws the child to the beasts. They stop to devour the child,
thus enabling the man and his driver to reach safety. The man insists
that had it not been for his foresight in tossing the child to the beasts,
he, the child, and the driver would have been destroyed; although the
act was unfortunate, it was the best act under the circumstances. In a
proper case, the saving of two at the expense of one, all else being
equal, would be morally right. Here, however, the man had a different
choice: he could have ensured the safety of two by heroically jumping
out and facing the animals himself. As he intentionally chose to kill
the child to save his own life, he has no excuse at common law.
In contrast is the following example. Two men, B and C, are
climbing a mountain, roped together for mutual protection. As they
inch along a narrow ledge, B suddenly slips off, dragging C over with
him. C manages to get a firm grip as he goes over the ledge, but hangs
there, with B dangling unconscious at the end of the rope some feet
below. C can hold on temporarily with one hand but cannot pull up B
with the other. C holds on grimly until he senses that momentarily his
grip will slip and both will plunge to their deaths. At that instant, C
cuts the rope, letting B drop to his death. Without the extra weight of
B, C is then able to pull himself up to safety. In this case, C did not
choose between himself and B: B was doomed. C could not do anything to save B. C's choice was either to save his own life, or to submit
to his own and B's deaths. While C may have violated the mountain3 It
eer's code, he has not violated the law; Cs act was excusable.
11.
12.

26 F. Cas. at 367.
14 Q.B.D. at 285, 15 Cox C.C. at 635.

13.

Nevertheless, C did commit homicide: by cutting the rope, an intentional act done
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would have been morally wrong for C to sacrifice his own life merely
because he could not save B.
The following pair of situations further highlights the distinction.
A ship suddenly sinks in midocean, leaving nothing on the surface of
the water except X, Y, and one life preserver. The weather is so rough
that the only hope of survival lies in firmly securing oneself to the preserver. In the first situation, X reaches the preserver first and has it
firmly fastened when the more powerful Y arrives. Unable to survive
without the preserver, Y wrests it from X, but does not inflict any physical injury upon A". Without the preserver, X drowns. In the second
situation, Y reaches the preserver first and swims away with it; X
drowns because he has no life preserver. In the first example, Y killed
X. He chose to sacrifice an obviously innocent person and has no excuse even though the act was necessary to save his own life. In the
second situation, Y did not kill X'; no act of Y deprived X of life. He
did not take the life preserver from X because X never had it. X's
drowning for want of a preserver cannot be attributed to Y.
Courts today, as at common law, generally do not recognize an
excuse for the intentional killing of an obviously innocent person, even
if necessary to save oneself from death.' 4 The refinements of this proposition, however, have not been adequately considered. If the victim
had no chance to survive in any case, or if no act of the survivor caused
the victim's death, the survivor's choice to save his or her own life
should be excused. Moreover, even when moral considerations require
the rejection of any claim of excuse, they do not require that mitigating
circumstances be overlooked. A killing in such an extreme situation is
far removed from murder, and should be held to be manslaughter. Although at least one court has expressly rejected such a claim, 15 other
courts have indirectly acknowledged mitigating circumstances. 16 Furfor the purpose of saving his own life, he advanced the death of B by at least a few seconds.
His choice, however, was excusable; C would make the "inexcusable choice" only when,
absent Cs act, B may otherwise have been saved.
14. A few of the new penal codes do not include the "inexcusable choice." See, e.g.,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975).
One statute that did not include the "inexcusable choice" was amended to correct this omission. "The Criminal Law Study Committee's Notes on the enactment of [Georgia] Code
Ann. § 26-906 explain the addition to the former law, Code Ann. §§ 26-401, 402, removing
the defense of coercion to a charge of murder, as adopting the common law approach that
one should die himself before killing an innocent victim." Thomas v. State, 246 Ga. 484,
486, 272 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1980).
15. State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 304, 58 A. 953, 955 (1904). See State v. Rhymes,
- Ariz. -, 628 P.2d 939, 942 (1981) ("[C]oercion can only act to reduce a reckless killing to
manslaughter. It has no application to an intentional killing.") (emphasis in original).
16. In Holmes, the grand jury refused to indict for murder, indicting instead for man-
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thermore, some of the new penal codes expressly provide that such a
17
killing is only manslaughter.
It has been suggested that duress cannot be recognized as an excuse for felony-murder even if the defendant did not do the killing, but
only joined the others in the commission of the felony to save his or her
life.' 8 This suggestion is untenable: an excusable felony does not exist,
because if the act is excused it is not a felony. A prohibited act committed under excusable duress is not a crime.' 9 For example, if D is compelled under threat of death to provide a getaway car for robbers, she is
not guilty of robbery. 20 In addition, if one of the guilty parties causes
death in the perpetration of the robbery, all the robbers are guilty of
felony-murder, 21 unless a statute provides an exception, 22 but D, who is

not a robber, is not guilty of homicide committed in the perpetration of
a felony. 23 She cannot be a perpetrator of a robbery of which she is
innocent. This situation must be distinguished from that in which one
who, having willingly joined in a robbery, asserts that he or she was
compelled during the perpetration to do something against his or her
will. This assertion will be rejected because the accused incurred cul24
pability by joining in the felony.
slaughter, and the conviction resulted in six-months imprisonment. 26 F. Cas. at 369. In
Dudley, the conviction was for willful murder, but the sentence of death was commuted to
imprisonment for six months. 14 Q.B.D. at 288, 15 Cox C.C. at 638.
17. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (West 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West
1958).
18. See People v. Petro, 13 Cal. App. 2d 245, 248, 56 P.2d 984, 95 (1936); State v.
Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 540, 120 P. 102, 104 (1912). In neither case was duress established by
the evidence.
19. White v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 546, 203 S.W.2d 222 (1947); Harris v. State, 91 Tex.
Crim. 446, 241 S.W. 175 (1922).
20. People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 611, 180 N.W. 418, 422 (1920); State v. St. Clair,
262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953).
21. In Commonwealth v. Allen, 475 Pa. 165, 175, 379 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1977), the court
noted: "As has been stated the cases are legion which provide that a participant in a robbery, such as appellant, 'acts with the kind of culpability' which is necessary to hold her
responsible in a death caused by a co-defendant acting in furtherance of the conspiratorial
scheme." Accord McKinney v. Sheriff, Clark County, 93 Nev. 70, 560 P.2d 151 (1977).
22. Some of the new penal codes provide an affirmative defense to a charge of felonymurder when the killing was committed by an accomplice, and the defendant did not in any
way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in its commission. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(2) (1977).
23. People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 611, 180 N.W. 418, 422 (1920); State v. St. Clair,
262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953).
24. This defense often is asserted by conspirators because frequently one conspirator is
in fear of the other "to a certain extent." Regina v. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616, 620, 173 Eng. Rep.
643, 645 (1838). However, in People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 611, 180 N.W. 418, 422
(1920), the court reasoned: "Such compulsion must have arisen without the negligence or
fault of the person who insists upon it as a defense." Accord Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82
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The Rule of Duress
The common law recognizes no excuse for the intentional killing
of an innocent person, even if necessary to save oneself from death, but
this is an exception to the rule of duress.2 5 The rule of duress provides

that a prohibited act is not a crime if the actor reasonably believed it to
be necessary to save himself or herself from imminent death or great
bodily injury.2 6 This excuse has been recognized not only in prosecutions for such offenses as reckless driving,2 7 malicious mischief,2 8 receiving stolen goods, 29 and escape,30 but also for such grave felonies as
burglary,3 ' robbery, 32 kidnapping,33 and arson.3 4 Even one who joins
the enemy forces in time of war is not guilty of treason if he or she does
so in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury, and escapes at the
first reasonable opportunity35 without having engaged in homicidal
N.E. 781 (1907); f. State v. Diana, 24 Wash. App. 908, 913-14, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1979)
(defense of necessity inapplicable when compelling circumstances brought about by the
accused).
25. Generally, a defendant must raise the defense of duress, but once raised, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the absence of duress. However, this is not a constitutional requirement. United States v. Calfon, 607 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1085 (1979).
26. This rule applies only to acts less grave than killing. "It appears to be established,
however, that although coercion or necessity will never excuse taking the life of an innocent
person, it will excuse lesser crimes." R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
177 F.2d 603, 605 (Ist Cir. 1949). "We hold that duress is a defense available in New Mexico except when the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring intent to kil." Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 501, 576 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1978).
27. Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137, 13 So.2d 54 (1943).
28. Rex v. Crutchley, 5 Car. & P. 133, 172 Eng. Rep. 909 (1831).
29. Attorney-General v. Whelan, 1934 Ir. Rep. 518 (1933).
30. In People v. Strock, 42 Colo. App. 404, 600 P.2d 91 (1979), rev'don othergrounds,
- Colo. -, 623 P.2d 42 (1981), the defendant was entitled to an instruction about duress in
view of evidence that there had been an attempt to kill him, that there was a "contract on his
life," and that he had received a note threatening him on the night of his escape. In United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the Supreme Court, noting that escape is a continuing
offense, held that "in order to be entitled to an instruction on duress or necessity as a defense
... . the escapee must first offer evidence justifying his continued absence from custody as
well as his initial departure and that an indispensable element of such an offer is testimony
of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or
necessity had lost its coercive force." Id at 412-13 (footnote omitted).
31. Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925).
32. People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920).
33. State v. Ellis, 232 Or. 70, 374 P.2d 461 (1962). The court recognized that duress
may excuse kidnapping, but held that duress had not been established.
34. Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907). In this case, although compulsion
was not established, the court did not question that a reasonable fear of immediate death
would have excused the burning of the dwelling.
35. Oldcastle's Case (1419), 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *10; 1
E. EAST, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 70-71 (London 1803); M. FOSTER,
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conduct. 36

Nature of the Compulsion
Not every fear of loss or harm will support the excuse of duress. It
has been said that no fear of loss or destruction of property, however

well grounded, will be recognized as a sufficient compulsion to excuse
the defendant's crime, 37 including fear based on a threat "to burn his
house to the ground, to destroy all his cattle and stock of corn and to
lay waste all that belonged to him."'38 This limitation is implicit in the
requirement that a cognizable defense of duress must be based on a
well-grounded apprehension of imminent death or great bodily injury.3 9 No excuse is available to one who had an obviously safe avenue
40
of escape before committing the prohibited act.
The requirement of a threat of imminent death or great bodily injury, however, has not been uniformly applied. Some courts have
drawn a line between levels of duress acceptable in civil, but not in
criminal cases; that is, what may be legally recognized as compulsion in
a civil case 4 1 may not necessarily be sufficient for an excuse in a criminal prosecution. 42 Although this line is readily perceptible, it would be
more appropriate to measure the degree of compulsion in light of the
gravity of the offense; the degree of compulsion sufficient to excuse
petty larceny may not be sufficient to excuse armed robbery. This apREPORT OF CROWN CASES AND DISCOURSES 216 (3d ed. 1809). "An American... charged

with playing the role of the traitor may defend by showing that force or coercion compelled
such conduct." Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952); c. Respublica v.
M'Carty, 2 Dall. 86 (Pa. 1781) (defendant not excused because he was still with the enemy
forces eleven months after he claimed to have been forced to join them).
36. See Axtell's Case, Kelyng, J. 13, 84 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1660).
37. United States v. Greiner, 26 F. Cas. 36, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 15,262); United
States v. Vigol, 2 Dall. 346, 347 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Respublica v. M'Carty, 2 Dall. 86 (Pa.
1781).
38. MacGrowther's Case, 18 Howell St. Tr. 391, 392, 168 Eng. Rep. 8, 8 (1746).
39. "Duress is a defense to a crime only 'when another's unlawful threat of death or
serious bodily injury reasonably causes the defendant to do a criminal act in a situation in
which there was no opportunity to avoid the threatened danger.'" United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567,
569 (9th Cir. 1977)). "The jury was properly instructed on Bates' coercion defense, which
requires a 'well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury.'" United States
v. Bates, 617 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1980).
40. Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1893); People v. Villegas, 29 Cal. App. 2d 658,
85 P.2d 480 (1938).
41. See 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1601, 1605 (3d ed. 1970).
42. See McCoy v. State, 78 Ga. 490, 497, 3 S.E. 768, 769 (1887); Ross v. State, 169 Ind.
388, 390-91, 82 N.E. 781, 781 (1907).
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proach has long been overlooked; 43 when the problem has been
squarely presented, however, courts generally have held that a threat of

something less than death or great bodily injury may be recognized as
an excuse in some prosecutions. 44 Thus, in a case in which a relatively
minor offense was alleged, the court held that the jury should have
been instructed that the defendant had a defense if he had been compelled to act under "such violence or threats . . . as are calculated to

inspire a just fear of great
operate on a person of ordinary firmness 'and
'45
injury to person, reputation, orpropery.

There is also some authority for the proposition that the acts may
be excused if the harm threatened is directed not at the actor, but at
members of the actor's family. 4 6 Such a threat may be more coercive
than a threat to the actor. A person might be willing to chance that a
threat to kill, if directed at that person, was only a bluff, but may not be
willing to chance it if it was a threat to kill his or her spouse or child.
The validity of the excuse, however, should not depend upon the rela-

tionship of the threatened party to the actor; a threat of harm to any
person should suffice. If the only choice is between the loss of human

life and the loss of property, a decision in favor of life is morally re43. Professor Hitchler noted that "the courts have not carefully graduated the injury
which must be threatened to the enormity of the crime for which it is invoked as excuse."
Hitchler, Duress as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REv. 519, 535 (1917).
44. Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (1940). InPerryman, there was
a threat of battery but no suggestion of a fear of death or great bodily injury. Accord People
v. Perez, 9 Cal. 3d 651, 510 P.2d 1026, 108 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1972).
In People v. Pryor, 70 A.D.2d 805, 806, 417 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1979), the trial court
"instructed the jury that to find that the defendant acted under duress they must find that
'the compulsion must be present and immediate and of such a nature as to induce a wellfounded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury."' The Appellate Division directed a new trial, holding that "It]he standard imposed by Trial Term is a more stringent
one than required by statute and is based on section 859 of the old Penal Law." Id.
In refusing to relax the requirement of fear of immediate death as an excuse for perjury,
the court in State v. Rosillo, 282 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. 1979), said that, while there may
be reason for some relaxation of the requirement, this would be a matter for legislation.
45. Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 303-04, 148 S.W. 48, 50 (1912) (emphasis
added).
46. R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 606-07 (1st Cir.
1949) (Magruder, C.J., concurring). An occasional statute includes threats of harm to
others. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3209 (1974) ("spouse, parent, child, brother or sister"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West 1958) ("another"). The case law tends to speak only of harm
threatened to the actor, however, a more inclusive statement has usually not been warranted
by the facts.
A few statutes explicitly limit'the defense to threats directed only at the actor. E.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1977); see People v. Jones,
105 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20-21, 164 Cal. Rptr. 124, 134-35 (1980).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

quired. 47 Consider, for example, a case in which a bank robber, holding a woman with a knife pressed against her throat, threatens to kill
her unless the teller hands over a bag filled with money. The teller,
reasonably believing that the woman, a complete stranger, would be
killed unless he obeys, complies with the robber's demand. Even
though the teller had never seen the woman before, it is almost beyond
belief that, under these circumstances, the teller could be successfully
prosecuted for embezzlement: the charge would be defeated on the
48
ground that the teller had acted under duress.
Command or Order
Under the rule of duress, some types of commands are deemed to
be a sufficient compulsion to excuse an otherwise criminal act. Under
the English "rule of coercion," the bare command of the husband was a
complete defense to any acts of the wife, except for a few severe crimes
such as treason or murder.4 9 This rule, the product of peculiarities of

English procedure and social custom, 50 has no proper place in the law
today, and many states now hold that it has been completely abrogated. 5' In addition, although the command of a parent has been held
no excuse for a child who commits a prohibited act without compul-

sion,52 the jury may find that a child under fourteen years of age lacks
criminal capacity if the child committed the deed in obedience to the
47. "The law deems the lives of all persons far more valuable than any property."
United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470).
48. Cf. People v. Lawson, 65 Mich. App. 562, 237 N.W.2d 559 (1976) (L entered S's
store, grabbed a woman from behind, held a gun to her head and said to S, "Give me your
money or she will get it." S took some money from the cash register and placed it in a
brown bag which was delivered to L. L's conviction of armed robbery was affirmed. The
court said that L's action had placed S in fear.).
49. Blackstone wrote that, except for crimes to which the defense is not available, if a
wife commits an act "by the coercion of her husband; or even in his company, which the law
construes a coercion; she is not guilty of any crime." BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *28.
Even before Blackstone, the rule was stated that the "command of a husband, without other
coercion" is sufficient to excuse the wife from criminal guilt. Anonymous, Lib. Ass. 27, f.
137, pl. 40 (1353).
50. The rationale underlying the rule was "that if the husband and wife commit burglary and larciny together, the wife shall be acquitted, and the husband only convicted ...
because otherwise for the same felony the husband may be saved by the benefit of his clergy,
and the wife hanged." 1 HALE, supra note 3, at *45.
51. Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 47-48, 189 P. 37, 38 (1920); Bell v. State, 92 Ga. 49,
51-52, 18 S.E. 186, 187 (1893); Wampler v. Corporation of Norton, 134 Va. 606, 611, 113
S.E. 733, 735 (1922). MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) expressly abrogates the ancient rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 209, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft
No. 10 (1960)).
52. Cagle v. State, 87 Ala. 38, 6 So. 300 (1888); People v. Richmond, 29 Cal. 414 (1866).
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parent's command.5 3
As military discipline does not permit a subordinate to conduct a
collateral inquiry to determine the lawfulness of an order received, military command is ordinarily a complete defense for the soldier who
executes it. Accordingly, a soldier is fully protected even if the order is
unlawful, assuming that under some circumstances the order would be
lawful. If, however, the illegality of the order is readily apparent to a
reasonable person, a soldier who obeys it is not protected.5 4 For example, a command to a sentry to kill anyone using opprobrious words, an
obviously unlawful order under all circumstances, would not justify or
excuse such a killing. 55 Similarly, an order to a soldier to assist his
superior in the perpetration of rape is not a lawful command related to
military duty and would not excuse the crime. 56 A peace officer's re57
quest to a deputy is no defense for making an obviously illegal arrest;
provide no immunity
the orders of a foreign government to its subject
58
country.
this
in
committed
act
for an illegal
Under circumstances involving a mistake of fact, an order or command may excuse an innocent agent's illegal act, if the comniand was
not obviously wrongful and was carried out in ignorance of the criminal purpose intended. This situation may arise, for example, when an
employer commits larceny by directing an employee to take another's
property and place it in the employer's house or store. The employee is
not guilty if he or she carries out5 9this instruction in the innocent belief
that it is the employer's chattel.
In some jurisdictions, certain employers may be authorized to direct their employees to perform acts that would otherwise be unlawful,
such as carrying a gun from one business location to another, and acts
performed under such authority are lawful. 60 Generally, however, the
mere existence of an order or command by an employer constitutes no
excuse for the intentional perpetration of a prohibited act,6 ' even if it is
by an employee whose job depends upon obeying his or her employer's
53. Commonwealth v. Mead, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 398 (1865).
54. Riggs v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 85, 87 (1866).
55. United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 14,589), rev'don
othergrounds, 16 U.S. 336 (1818).
56. State v. Roy, 233 N.C. 558, 64 S.E.2d 840 (1951).
57. Roberts v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 365, 144 S.W.2d 811 (1940).
58. Giugni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786, 791 (Ist Cir. 1942).
59. See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 20 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1082 (1980).
60. Cassi v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 369, 216 S.W. 1099 (1919).
61. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 134 Ala. 126, 132,33 So. 130, 132 (1902); Hately v. State,
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orders. 62 This rule will be recognized at once as an echo of the ancient
view that nothing less than a well-grounded fear of imminent death or
grea( bodily injury can be recognized as duress. As the modem trend is
to modify this strict position by conceding that less may be sufficient for
duress in some criminal cases, the employer's command should be reassessed. It is not necessary to punish the employee on the theory that
otherwise the crime must go unpunished, because the employer who
63
gave the order is clearly guilty and may be punished for the crime.
The fact that the employer caused the crime to be committed by the
employee might be considered in the determination of the employer's
punishment if the determination is discretionary. If the employee's job
is at stake, or at least the employee believes the job to be at stake, the
coercive force of the employer's command may be very great. The excuse thus should be recognized in certain situations.
Future Harm •
Although it often has been repeated that no threat of future harm
will constitute a viable duress defense, 64 courts have not hesitated to
disregard this principle when presented with an extreme case. 65 To insist that no threat of future harm could ever be sufficient to excuse a
prohibited act, no matter how grave the threat or small the offense, is
utterly unrealistic. The time has come to reject the notion that there is
any substantially impelling influence that could never constitute a duress defense in any criminal case. It should be emphasized that the
wording of the rule of duress had to be extreme for it to be recognized
15 Ga. 346, 348 (1854); City of New York v. Flynn, 140 Misc. 497, 498-99, 250 N.Y.S. 488,
490 (1931). 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 1, § 14 at 5 (8th ed. 1824).
"Loyalty to a superior does not provide a license for crime." United States v. Decker,
304 F.2d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 1962). Acting in the capacity of an employee is no defense for
one who has intentionally violated the law. People v. McCauley, 192 Colo. 545, 548, 561
P.2d 335, 337 (1977).
62. Moore v. State, 23 Ala. App. 432, 127 So. 796 (1930), cert. denied, 221 Ala. 50, 127
So. 797 (1930). "An employee is not immune from punishment for his participation in criminal conspiracy upon any such idea as that his employment required him to engage therein."
Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928).
63. "[A] person who causes an innocent party to commit an act which, if done with the
requisite intent, would constitute an offense may be found guilty as a principal even though
he personally did not commit the criminal act." United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 20 (2d
Cir. 1979), cer t. denied, 444 U.S. 1082 (1980). In legal theory one has done what one has
caused another to do. Commonwealth v. Nabried, 264 Pa. Super. 419, 399 A.2d 1121 (1979).
64. People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 P. 1034 (1910); State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1191,
1203, 264 N.W. 77, 83 (1935); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953).
65. Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (1940). In this case an inmate
was threatened by a guard. Although there was a threat of present harm, it was not a deadly
threat. The threat of constant repetition, however, made it particularly coercive.
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as a valid rule of law. The formulation of a rule of law, however, does
-

not exhaust the possible situations that can be covered by the rule.
The Duress Standard
The age-old rule of duress, that the commission of a prohibited act
is not a crime if reasonably believed to be necessary to prevent death or
great bodily injury, together with the equally ancient exception, the
"inexcusable choice," are as vital today as ever.66 They provide the

answers whenever applicable. These precepts, however, are not applicable in every situation. In the areas that fall beyond the parameters of
the rules, two conclusions emerge: (1) an excuse should be recognized

in some of these situations, and (2) a case-by-case analysis should be
employed.
For example, a threatened unlawful physical injury might be very
painful without approaching death or great bodily injury. On the other
hand, such threatened harm may be moderate. Similarly, the prohibited act committed to avoid the threatened harm may be a grave felony

without involving death or great bodily injury, or it may be a minor
misdemeanor. Moreover, the harm threatened and the act done to
avoid that harm could, in various degrees of gravity, create unlimited

possibilities. An attempt to regulate this field with rules and exceptions
would be futile and should not be made. Only a standard could be
effective here, 67 and the appropriate standard is that of a reasonable
person in like circumstances. The Model Penal Code has adopted a

similar, but incomplete, version of this standard. 68

A few states have modified this rule by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975). In these statutes, the
defense is based upon a threat that a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable
to resist.
67. A standard is a legal device employed to enable the factfinder to apply common
sense to the complicated facts of a particular situation. See R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING
TO LAW 58-59 (1951). Some complain that a standard is not certain. If it were certain,
however, it would not be a standard, but a rule, which is a device for attaching a clear-cut
legal consequence to a clear-cut state of facts. Id. at 56. Thus, it is a rule of the common law
that there is no homicide (a clear-cut legal consequence) unless death followed the harm
within a year and a day (a clear-cut set of facts). A standard is employed when rules are not
practicable. The best-known example is that used to distinguish between due care and negligence: the care a reasonable person would employ in like circumstances.
68. The Model Penal Codes reasonable-person standard for duress refers to "a person
of reasonable firmness." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
These words do not change the standard, because a reasonable person would be reasonably
firm. However, the section unwisely does not provide for the "inexcuseable choice." Quite
properly, § 2.09(1) includes a threat of "unlawful force against his person or the person of
another," thus adopting the modem trend in two respects: it does not limit duress to (1) a
66.

§ 53A-14 (West 1972); N.Y.
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In summary, whenever the compulsion is less than a threat of
death or great bodily injury, and the threatened harm is avoided without the killing of an innocent person, it is necessary to weigh the compulsion against the harm. If, under all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would have been impelled to avoid such threatened harm by
doing what was done by the defendant, the defense should be recognized; otherwise it should not. It is for the judge to instruct the jury
that this is the law, and for the jury to decide, as a matter of fact,
whether or not the standard has been met.
'69
Necessity: "Duress of Circumstances"

If, as the result of natural forces, and not the compulsion of another, a person must either suffer detriment or commit an act that violates the letter of the law, that person acts out of "necessity." 70 The
"inexcusable- choice" doctrine applies here, as in the law of duress.
One may not intentionally kill an innocent person even if necessary to
save one's own life. The best-known cases in this field, United States v.
Holmes7 1 and The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens,72 were both cases of
"necessity." On the other hand, if circumstances have generated a
well-grounded belief that, without a prompt act of avoidance, death or
threat of deadly force, or (2) a threat of violence against the actor. Additional defects of the
Model Penal Code are discussed in notes 99-109 & accompanying text infra.
69. The elements of the defense of necessity "are that defendants must have reasonably
believed that their action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm, that there
are no other adequate means except those which were employed to avoid the threatened
harm, and that a direct causal relationship may reasonably be anticipated between the
action taken and the avoidance of the harm." United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102
(4th Cir. 1979). "Generally, necessity is available as a defense when the physical forces of
nature or the pressure of circumstances cause the accused to take unlawful action to avoid a
harm which social policy deems greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law."
State v. Diana, 24 Wash. App. 908, 913, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1979).
70. One of the earliest references is Pollard's argument for the defendant that "a man
may break the words of the law, and yet not break the law itself," as when the words are
broken "through necessity." Reniger v. Fogossa, 1 Plowd. 1, 18, 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 29 (1550).
Pollard included a biblical reference to the excuse for eating sacred bread, normally forbidden, because it was through "necessity of hunger." Matthew 12:3, 4. Professor Stephen
refers to "compulsion by necessity." 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 105 (1883). State v. Diana, 24 Wash. App. 908, 916, 604 P.2d 1312, 1317 (1979),
provides a modem example of necessity: "To summarize, medical necessity exists in this
case if the court finds that (1) the defendant reasonably believed his use of marijuana was
necessary to minimize the effects of multiple sclerosis; (2) the benefits derived from its use
are greater than the harm sought to be prevented by the controlled substances law; and
(3) no drug is as effective in minimizing the effects of the disease."
71. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). See text accompanying notes 9-11
supra.
72. 14 Q.B.D. 273, 15 Cox C.C. 624 (1884). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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great bodily injury will result, the commission of any prohibited act
necessary for safety will be excused if it does not involve the "inexcusable choice."
The reference in the Book of Jonah to the jettison of the cargo of a
vessel to save the lives of those on board, 73 an act that is unquestionably excusable if it is reasonably necessary for the purpose, has its counterpart in modem cases. What would otherwise constitute attempted
revolt on the high seas may be excused if the sailors returned to port, in
violation of the captain's orders, because the vessel was not seaworthy
and they were in danger of imminent death from the elements. 74 Similarly, the master of a vessel may take refuge in any port during a vioall on board, even if an embargo forbids the
lent storm for the safety of
75
port.
that
enter
to
vessel
In some cases of necessity, as opposed to duress, the courts have
not hesitated to recognize that something less than utter catastrophe
would constitute an excuse. Thus, a father is not guilty of the offense of
withdrawing a child from school without first obtaining permission of
the school board, if the absence is necessary because of the child's illness. 76 One unavoidably caught in a traffic jam is not guilty of violating the law that prohibits stopping at that place. 77 A carrier does not
violate a statute requiring a specified coach if the failure to provide that
coach on a particular occasion is due to an unavoidable accident that
ordinary prudence could not have prevented. 78 One who kills a deer
does not violate the game law if this killing was necessary to prevent
substantial damage to the deer killer's property. 79 Moreover, an emergency may excuse what would otherwise be a violation of the speed
law.80 These are not situations, it should be noted, in which no choice
was made: the driver in heavy traffic elected to stop rather than proceed until the vehicle was brought to a halt by actual contact with the
one ahead; the carrier could have avoided sending the train without the
specified coach by sending no train at all; the deer killer could instead
73. Jonah 1:5.
74. United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470).
75. The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694).
76. State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).
77. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434 (1868).
78. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 84 S.W. 566 (1905).
79. State v. Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 152 N.W. 501 (1915); accord Cross v. State, 370 P.2d
371 (Wyo. 1962).
80. A speed of 67 miles an hour in a 50-mile zone was excused when it was necessary in
an emergency to avoid a traffic accident. People v. Cataldo, 65 Misc. 2d 286, 316 N.Y.S.2d
873 (1970). Military necessity is a defense to a charge of violation of the state speed law.
State v. Burton, 41 R.L 303, 103 A. 962 (1918).
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have allowed the property to be damaged; the speeding driver could
have ignored the demands of the emergency.
The problem that seems to have aroused the most discussion, 81
and the least litigation, is that of taking food. Lord Bacon said that "if
a man steals viands to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor
larceny. ' 82 Hale, Blackstone, and East disagreed: 83 Hale argued that
"by the laws of this kingdom sufficient provision is made for the supply
of such necessities by collection for the poor," 84 and Blackstone
thought it "impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to support nature." 85 By skirting the
real issue, however, these writers undercut the force of their opposition
to Lord Bacon.
The hunger defense must be distinguished from the defense of "economic necessity." As it has been used, this defense does not necessarily imply an actual need to satisfy hunger; thus, it is not an acceptable
defense to a criminal charge. 86 The law cannot excuse an act merely
because a "false sense of shame" 87 has induced a person to steal rather
than to make application to the proper authorities.8 8 Such thievery is
prompted not by necessity but only by convenience.
In contrast, if a mountaineer, trapped for several days in a remote
spot by a sudden blizzard, breaks into an empty cabin and eats some of
the owner's food to satisfy his or her hunger, the act would be excused
because of necessity. 89 The mountaineer had no alternative. Moreover, the excuse would be recognized even if he or she would not actually have died of starvation.
Choice of Evils
A person entirely without fault, and in no danger of injury or
81. The applicability of the defense of necessity in cases involving the taking of food
"has occasioned great speculation among the writers .
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at
*31.
82. The Maxims of the Law, regula V, in 4 WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 34 (London
1819).
83. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *31-32; 2 E. EAST, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 698-99 (London 1803); HALE, supra note 3, at *53-55.
84. HALE, supra note 3, at *54-55.
85. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *32.
86. State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d 638 (1933).
87. 2 E. EAST, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 699 (London 1803).
88. The defense of necessity is not available if the threatened harm could reasonably
have been avoided by means other than those taken. United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101
(4th Cir. 1979).
89. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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harm, may inadvertently cause injury or harm to some other innocent
person. Such an unavoidable accident carries no implication of criminal guilt. A different situation arises when a person has a choice about
which of two or more persons will suffer because of the inadvertent act.
If the same type of harm would result regardless of the decision made,
the actor has no real choice. If, however, a different degree or type of
harm may ensue, the actor is confronted with a true choice of evils.
The following hypotheticals may illuminate the distinction drawn
above. Suppose a motorist, driving with due care, is suddenly confronted with a terrible situation. Three small children dash into the
street in front of her, leaving her with no possibility of avoiding all
three. If the motorist does nothing to minimize the harm, all three will
be killed. In the first instance, the driver swerves quickly to the left,
avoiding two but killing one. In the second situation the driver swerves
suddenly to the right, thus avoiding one but killing two. Both situations are unavoidable accidents, which do not implicate criminal guilt,
because they offer no opportunity for a deliberate choice. The driver
must make a split-second decision in an effort to minimize unavoidable
harm. In the first situation, she accomplished the best result possible
under the circumstances; in the second, she did not. Actions taken
under emergency conditions do not always achieve the best possible
result, and the law cannot require the best possible result in such
situations.
By comparison, consider an emergency, similar to the one above,
in which time permits an evaluation and a deliberate choice. In this
case, an act that is bound to kill one, but is necessary to avoid killing
the other two, would be morally right and have no suggestion of criminal guilt; however, an act that is bound to kill two, but is necessary to
avoid killing one, would be so morally wrong as to require punishment.
Although the actor may have thought that the loss of the one saved
would have been a greater harm than the death of the other two, for
these purposes at least, the law regards all alike.
The "inexcusable choice" exception involves, in essence, the
choice of oneself over another. 90 The "choice of evils" would not be a
90. Although more than two people may be involved, the actual "inexcusable choice"
is always between the actor's own life and the life of another. Assume the pilot of a large
ship, with hundreds on board, is faced with a sudden emergency in which she must either
swerve suddenly to the right or else wreck the vessel with consequent great loss of life. To
make this turn she will run down and undoubtedly kill a man in a rowboat. Obviously the
pilot must do what is necessary to save the ship in such a situation, and she will do this
without criminal guilt. She will intentionally kill the rower and save her own life, but that is
a small part of the whole picture. She will not make a choice between herself and the man
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defense to an actor who made this "inexcusable choice" because what
was avoided-loss of the actor's own life-would never be viewed as a
harm greater than the death of another, innocent person. 91 Thus, in the
hypothetical case in which the man threw the child to the pursuing
beasts, 92 he could have achieved the result of sacrificing one to save two
by jumping out and facing the animals himself. In The Queen v. Dudley
& Stephens,93 in which the sailors killed the boy so that they might live,
each sailor could have saved three at the expense of one by offering to
sacrifice himself. Instead, each chose to sacrifice another to save his
own life. If the choice was between the certain death of two and the
certain death of one, however, with no possibility of realignment, the
only morally acceptable choice would be to save the two. This would
be true even if the actor making the choice was one of the two saved.
Differences in the fault or responsibility of the parties, however,
may alter this balance. For example, in UnitedStates v. Holmes,94 the
court noted that, according to the tradition of the sea, sailors should
sacrifice themselves for the safety of passengers, except that a "sufficient number of seamen to navigate the boat must be preserved." 95 In
an extreme situation involving fault, such as attempted murder, the
killing of two or more would-be murderers is justifiable if reasonably
necessary to save the life of one innocent victim. One who is free from
fault is privileged to use deadly force if this action reasonably seems
necessary to save an innocent victim from murder. 96 The scales in such
in the boat; she will make a choice between hundreds of lives and one life-and the choice
she makes is morally compelled. The large number is not required for the result and is used
only for emphasis. The number two would do.
91. Some may take it for granted that the "inexcusable choice" is duly covered by the
Model Penal Code's section on choice of evils. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Offi-

cial Draft 1962). This section provides, in substance, that an actor who has committed an act
that violates the letter of the law has a defense if what he or she avoided would have caused

a greater harm than was caused by the act. This would be no defense to an actor who had
made the "inexcusable choice" because what he or she avoided (loss of his or her own life)
would never, in the legal view, be greater than the harm caused by killing an innocent person. But an actor who has no defense under this section may still have an "affirmative
defense" under the section on duress. Id. § 2.09.
92. See text following note 12 supra.
93. 14 Q.B.D. 273, 15 Cox C.C. 624 (1884). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
94. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). See text accompanying notes 9, 11
supra.

95. Id. at 367.
96. The common law authorizes the use of deadly force if it is reasonably necessary to
prevent a forcible felony. Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 339 (1882); State v. Nyland, 47 Wash.
2d 240, 242-43, 287 P.2d 345, 347 (1955); State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 137-38, 224 P.
420, 422 (1924); BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *180. This view is incorporated in some of

the new penal codes. For example, the Illinois statute provides that deadly force may be
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a case are used not to weigh numbers, but to weigh innocence against
guilt.
As is true in cases of duress, if the choice is between the destruc-

tion of life and the destruction of property, a decision in favor of life is
morally right, while a decision in favor of property is so morally wrong
as to require punishment. 97 If the threat to person is only of a minor
nature, however, a decision to prevent great property loss would be
morally acceptable. Thus, a sudden and violent shove of an innocent

person would be excusable if necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of very valuable property.
The choice of evils is not a substitute for the duress standard. In
the ordinary duress case, the issue is whether the duress or necessity

was such that a reasonable person under like circumstances would have
been impelled to do what was done by the defendant. 98 The choice of
evils, on the other hand, is used only in exceptional situations: when
only persons other than the actor were endangered, or when human life

is at stake but the rules relating to duress do not apply.
The choice-of-evils doctrine, however, may be employed to compensate for deficiencies in the rule of duress. For example, the Model

Penal Code section on duress 99 unfortunately fails to include duress in
any form other than actual or threatened personal injury. 00 The
Model Penal Code section on choice of evils' 0 ' has been interpreted as
governing the problems of impelled perpetration omitted by the duress

section.102 The choice-of-evils section provides that conduct believed
to be necessary to avoid harm or evil to the actor or to another is justifiable if the harm avoided is greater than the harm sought to be preused if reasonably believed to be necessary to prevent "the commission of a forcible felony."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-I (Smith-Hurd 1972). A few statutes include some restriction,
such as a belief that the other "is using or about to use deadly physical force." See, e.g.,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
97. See note 47 supra.
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) uses the phrase:
"would have been unable to resist." This phrase, however, does not apply in the choice-ofevils section. Id. § 3.02.
99. Id. § 2.09. This section is forward looking in many respects. The section is not
limited to a threat of death or great bodily injury, or to a threat directed against the actor.
100. The section would be improved if, under the heading "duress and necessity," it
allowed every type of substantially impelling influence to be a defense if a person of reasonable firmness in like circumstance would have been impelled to do what was actually done,
and this did not involve the "inexcusable choice."
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
102. The Code provides that when conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable
under the choice-of-evils section, the duress section does not preclude the choice-of-evils
defense. Id. § 2.09(4).
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vented by law. However, several problems inhere in using this section
for all situations involving impelled perpetration.
On the surface, one rule of law in such a case appears obvious. In
regard to the death of innocent persons, a court could recognize that, as
a rule of law, the greater the number of deaths, the greater the harm.
In a choice between the loss of life and the loss of property, the law
regards the loss of life as a greater harm than the loss of any
10 3
property.
This rule may, however, be too inelastic in some circumstances.
Suppose, for example, an employee is ordered by his employer to perform a task that will necessarily involve an unlawful application of
force to an innocent person, although without any risk of death or serious bodily injury; the employee knows that he will be fired if he does
not obey. There is no possible rule of law providing that loss of a job is
a greater harm than such a battery, because a job may be only temporary or otherwise relatively unimportant, whereas even such a battery
may be serious and very painful. In addition, there is no possible rule
of law that the loss of a job is not a greater harm than such a battery,
because a job may be very important and a battery moderate. No rigid
rule is appropriate in this situation. As rules are not feasible here, it is
again necessary to establish a standard, such as a standard that would
allow a defense if a reasonable person, so situated, would have believed
that the harm avoided was greater than the harm caused. The Model
Penal Code section on choice of evils, unfortunately, is concerned with
actuality rather than with belief. 104 Some state statutes may offer better
models than the Model Penal Code. For example, the Illinois penal
code section on choice of evils10 5 refers to a defendant who reasonably
believed that his or her conduct was necessary to avoid greater harm
than it caused. The Oregon choice-of-evils statute10 6 has been interpreted to recognize a defense if "it was reasonable for the defendant to
believe that the need to avoid the injury was greater than the need to
103.

See note 47 supra.

104. This section refers to conduct that "the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another," but the conduct is justifiable only if "the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the defense charged." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
There is no reference comparable to "a person of reasonable firmness" found in the duress
section. Id. § 2.09. Perhaps this language was chosen because of some skepticism regarding
the ordinary person's inclination to have any belief about the relative degree of harmfulness
of unrelated harms.
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
106.

OR. REv. STAT. § 161.200 (1979).
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avoid the injury the [other statute] seeks to prevent."' 10 7 In effect, the
Oregon court has recognized that the defense is available if a reasonable person would have believed that the harm avoided was greater
than the harm caused.108 These state statutes provide an acceptable
standard, focusing on belief and not on actuality. The issue is not
whether the harm avoided was in fact greater than the harm caused,
but rather whether the defendant reasonably believed it to be so. To
hold otherwise might result in the conviction of a defendant for doing
what any ordinary person would have done under the circumstances, a
patently unacceptable result.
The result reached under these state statutes, however, frequently
may be the same as the result under the Model Penal Code. Although
belief about the relativity of degree of competing harms may influence
a defendant's action, the change in these state statutes towards focusing
on the defendant's belief makes no useful contribution. To the extent
that the result is to be determined by a standard, the law is left as
before. The standard employed in these state statutes is less satisfactory than the one they replaced. The simplest and best way to present
such a problem to the jury is one that, in effect, invites consideration of
what each juror would have done under the circumstances, rather than
one that invites the juror to consider whether the defendant acted reasonably in his or her belief.
The only useful purpose of a statute on choice of evils is to provide
for situations in which it is proper for the law to dictate the choice that
must be made because no other choice would be morally acceptable.
Sometimes this purpose is emphasized in the statute itself. For example, the Colorado statute provides:
When evidence relating to the defense ofjustification under this section is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established,
107. State v. Burney, 49 Or. App. 529, 532, 619 P.2d 1336, 1339 (1980). The defendant
was held to have a defense to a charge of being an ex-convict in possession of a firearm if he
took possession to defend himself against a threat of great bodily harm and was arrested
before he had a reasonable opportunity to divest himself thereof in a manner that would not
create a public peril. Without the statute he would have had a defense under the common
law of duress. Thus, a California court held that use of a concealable firearm in defense of
self or others in an emergency situation does not violate the statute making it an offense for a
felon or addict to have in his or her possession a firearm capable of being concealed on his
or her person. People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 24-25, 582 P.2d 1000, 1007-08, 148 Cal. Rptr.
409, 416-17 (1978).
108. This interpretation of the opinion is likely to be followed because the only legal test
of reasonableness, for such a purpose, is the reasonable-person test.
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constitute a justification.10 9
A provision of this type would allow the court to limit more effectively
the choice-of-evils defense to its appropriate use.
Conclusion
The age-old rules of duress and necessity, with their equally ancient exception, are as sound today as ever, but they occupy only a part
of the potential field. The rest of the field comprises situations so variable, however, that an effort to formulate rules and exceptions would be
futile. Resort to a reasonable-person standard is necessary; thus, the
factfinder should ask what a reasonable person would do in the same
situation. Such a standard is sufficiently pliant to accommodate any
fact situation that may arise along an endless spectrum of possibilities.
Legislation in this field might well consist of two statutes in substantially the following form:
Duress andNecessity. Except for the intentional or reckless taking of human life, one who did not culpably cause, or enter into, the
critical situation and is not otherwise at fault, has a defense if he or
she acted under such compulsion, from whatever source, that a person of reasonable firmness in such a situation would have been unable to resist doing what the actor did.
Choice of Evils. In a criminal prosecution, it shall be a defense if
it can be established as a matter of law that the actor's conduct
avoided greater harm than it caused, in the only way that seemed
reasonably possible under the circumstances.
The first proposal relies upon the reasonable-person standard for
all situations not within the inexcusable-choice exception. The second
proposal allows the reasonable-person standard to determine whether
the conduct, as such, is acceptable, but relies entirely upon the court to
determine whether one harm was, or was not, greater than the other.
For example, in a situation in which the conduct in question avoided
the loss of two or more lives by causing the death of one, the harm
avoided was greater than the harm caused. The proposed section, however, would not provide an excuse for the hypothetical man who threw
the child to the beasts because there was another way, reasonably possible under the circumstances, to accomplish the result. His choice that
the child be the one to die is not acceptable.
If most actual cases are tested by a reasonable-person standard,
inevitably some defendants whose conduct caused greater harm than it
109. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-702(2) (1978); see People v. Strock, - Colo. -, 623 P.2d
42, 44 (1981) (choice of evils defense denied for lack of proper foundation, but duress instruction properly granted).
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avoided will be acquitted. Although this result does not meet the test

of strict morality, it is nevertheless unavoidable. The criminal law was
never intended to be a complete moral code. I" 0 Only when conduct

falls far below proper moral behavior is punishment deemed appropriate. I If extreme situations are governed by rules of law, leaving only
lesser problems to be tested by the standard, conduct no worse than

that of the ordinary reasonable person may at times fall short of the full
measure of strict morality, but not very far short-not far enough to
merit punishment.
The criminal law does not hesitate to dictate that no one may
choose between oneself and another, who may live and who must die,

by intentionally killing an obviously innocent person, but in general it
is not primarily concerned with the relativity of different harms. In this
regard, the law's chief concern is that, except for such an extreme situation," 12 no one should be punished for doing what any reasonable person would have done.

110. "The criminal law cannot be simply a code of right behavior. It must be, rather, a
specification of behavior so far below common standards that it identifies the actor as a
dangerous and reprehensible person, who does not respond to the normal restraints of education, morality and custom." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 251.4, Comment 2 at 483 (1980).
Ill. "[T]he settled principle [is] that penal sanctions should be reserved for that which
virtually the entire community is willing to condemn." Id. Comment 4 at 489.
112. This statement is not intended to suggest that a reasonable person would intentionally kill an obviously innocent person in order to save his or her own life, but only that the
law does not leave this determination for either the individual or the jury.

